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Abstract—Recent developments in advanced sensors, wireless
communications and intelligent vehicle control technologies have
enabled vehicles to detect traffic anomalies on the road and then
notify surrounding vehicles to improve traffic safety. However,
due to the high-speed movement of vehicles and the frequent
topological changes between vehicles, it is difficult for vehicles
to evaluate the credibility of received messages. Quite a lot
of research effort has been carried out to establish various
trustworthiness platforms. These studies mostly focus on how to
enhance the accuracy of credibility evaluation, overlooking that
the transmission performance may affect the quality of vehicle
messages. In this paper, we aim to support the improvement
of credibility evaluation in vehicle networks by enhancing the
transmission experience of vehicles. The proposed solution utilizes
the vehicle’s trajectory information, detection range and a road-
side unit (RSU) coverage to form a controlled number of detection
zones, which guarantees that events can be detected and reported
while limiting the number of transmission vehicles. Furthermore,
our scheme takes account of vehicle credibility and interference
ranges when selecting reporting vehicles, supporting the timely
and reliable delivery of vehicles event reports when accidents
occur. Our ns2 evaluation shows that our scheme can greatly
reduce delay and loss rates of vehicle messages to help existing
studies on accurate vehicle credibility evaluation.
Index Terms—vehicle transmissions, vehicle networks, vehicle
trustworthiness, vehicle trust management
I. INTRODUCTION
In vehicle networks, vehicles are equipped with various
onboard sensors to collect and share road-related information
(e.g., road conditions, traffic congestion, accidents) with an
RSU. Such information helps vehicles and RSUs to be aware
of any emergency as well as predict potential traffic conges-
tion, improving transportation safety and efficiency. However,
due to the high mobility of vehicles, an RSU receives contacts
or messages from different vehicles overtime. Therefore, it is
important for an RSU to accurately understand the credibility
of different vehicles, supporting efficient traffic and road
management.
Much research effort has been spent on various algorithms,
experiments, and technical standardisations in order to enhance
the trustworthiness of vehicle reports. In general, they can
be classified as centralised solutions or distributed solutions.
Centralised solutions e.g., [1], [2]), employ central servers
to collect feedback or reports from vehicles. With vehicles’
reports, central servers can then make action decisions based
on vehicles’ credibility. For distributed solutions (e.g., [3]–[5]),
they allow vehicles to send feedback or reports to each other.
The trustworthiness of these reports is evaluated by vehicles
based on the credibility and the locations of reporting vehicles.
Vehicles may also update the credibility of other vehicles
based on the evaluation results of those received reports. These
related studies mainly focus on efficiently evaluating and
dynamically updating vehicle credibility ratings by referring to
received reports/feedback and historic vehicle behaviour. Most
of them assume that vehicle reports are received accurately and
in real time for making decisions and updating credibility.
In a vehicle network, multiple adjacent vehicles may de-
tect events or accidents on the road simultaneously. When
they report such detection, the transmissions of their reports
may interfere with each other due to the wireless broadcast
property. Such interference easily causes packet loss, data
errors, or long transmission delays [6]–[9], negatively affecting
the report quality received at receivers. In another words,
the trustiness of vehicle reports not only relies on vehicles’
credibility and behaviour but also is affected by transmission
quality. In this paper, we investigate how to support accurate
trust management in vehicle networks by improving vehicle
transmission experience. In detail, we present the following
contributions.
• Formation of detection zones. The coverage of the RSU
is divided into a controlled number of detection zones
based on vehicles detection range. Detection zones are
formed to limit the number of vehicles sending reports
to an RSU, while ensuring these selected vehicles to be
able to report events anywhere on the road.
• Allocation and ranking of vehicles. Vehicles on the road
are allocated to detection zones periodically based on
their current locations, due to the frequent dynamicity of
vehicles locations. Within each detection zone, vehicles
are ranked in terms of their credibility. The ranking is
also updated dynamically to reflect changes in vehicles
detection zones.
• Selection of reporting vehicles. Within each detection
zone, a subset of vehicles is selected to report on any
road events that may be detected. This selection refers
to the ranking of vehicles inside a detection zone, as
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well as the distances between vehicles so as to control
report transmission interference. These two factors are
combined as a vehicle weight by which reporting vehicles
are selected periodically to report road events to the RSU.
Our NS2 simulation results show that our method greatly
helps the selected schemes in terms of controlling report loss
rates and average report delays when vehicles send feedback to
the RSU. More specifically, in our simulations, our approach
helps existing vehicle trust management schemes to achieve a
report loss rate < 5% with acceptable average report delays.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives a comprehensive overview of current literature related
to trustworthiness schemes in vehicle networks. Section III
presents our proposed mechanism. Section IV describes the
simulation methodology and performance evaluation between
two selected solutions with and without our proposed solution.
Finally, we make some concluding remakes in section V.
II. RELATED WORK
As a fundamental topic, a trust management scheme is
considered in every emerging technology. In the past five
years, many researchers [2]–[4], [10]–[12] paid attention to
design a trustworthiness solution in vehicle networks. These
solutions utilize vehicles, RSUs and cloud servers to monitor
malicious behaviours. Wang et al. [2] proposed a central-
ized trustworthiness solution. The cloud servers is utilized to
collect, evaluate, and store the trust values of all vehicles.
The central server is usually assumed to be a fully trusted
entity. However, the centralized solution is not practical to
cope with large numbers of vehicles, resulting in high latency.
Besides, the single point of failure is another big challenge
of using centralized solution. Shrestha et al. [10] proposed a
peer to peer verification scheme to reduce the computation and
transmission delay caused by the centralized solution. Liao et
al. [13] used an RSU to evaluate the credibility of vehicles
based on the accuracy of their previous incident reporting
(by comparing it with actual ground truth). The solution
reduces the number of false positives and false negatives, but
the solution has not solved the single point failed problem.
Similarly, Huang et al. [14] utilized the RSUs to construct
a decentralized solution to remove the single point of failure
problem, the distributed RSUs store the vehicels’ credibility,
and the vehicle can request the RSU to query the credibility
of neighbouring vehicles. However, this design encounters a
consistent data issue. Yang et al. [4] proposed a decentralized
trust management system based on blockchain technology to
address the consistent data issue. Yangs solution aggregates all
the received reports using specific algorithms. If the aggregated
value exceeds a threshold, the receiver will trust the content of
the data and update the credibility of all the reporting vehicle
in the blockchain.
The conventional solutions do not take into account the
impact quality of service (QoS) particularly in a dense traffic
scenario [7], [15]–[19], which may lead to a large transmission
delay and a high report loss rate. This paper performs an
experimental study of the proposed algorithm, we aim to
improve the transmission quality in existing solutions by
considering vehicle credibility and interference ranges when
selecting reporting vehicles.
III. THE VEHICLE TRANSMISSION SCHEDULING
ALGORITHM (VTS)
Denote a RSU as R. In our system, instead of asking all
vehicles to report road events, R selects a subset of vehicles in
its coverage to report road events. The selection of this subset
of vehicles is not trivial as it is hard to predict where on a road
an event would happen and the accurate detection distance
of a vehicle is limited. Our idea is to divide R’s coverage
into a controlled number of detection zones that vehicles are
dynamically allocated to. Then, within each detection zone, the
vehicle selection scheme is designed to select event reporting
vehicles based on their rankings. This ensures that events can
be detected and reported no matter where on the road that
events take place.
A. Formation of Detection Zones
The formation of detection zones (DZs) is implemented by
R. In order to allow vehicles inside a DZ to accurately sense
events in this zone, R forms DZs by referring to the accurate
detection distance of the vehicles. Meanwhile, in order to form
a controlled number of DZs within the coverage of R, our
detection zones are in the shape of cubes. This is because
cubes not only may fully cover R’s coverage without overlaps
but also require relatively simple calculations as compared to
other shapes.
Without loss of generality, assume R locates at (0,0,0) and
the accurate detection distance of vehicles in our system is d.
R forms the first DZ by regarding itself as the central point
of the cube. Then, in order to guarantee any vehicles inside
this DZ can accurately sense events in this zone, the longest
distance in this DZ (i.e., the length of a diagonal line (shown
by the blue dotted line in Fig.1)) should be ≤ d. To form the
DZ as large as possible, helping to reduce the number of DZs
that need to form in R’s coverage, we use d as the length of a
diagonal line in this DZ. Therefore, the sides of the DZ should
have the length s of the sizes of a DZ is calculated as
(
√
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3
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With the side value of the DZ, it is not hard to obtain the
eight vertices as illustrated by red numbers in Fig.1. More
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eight vertices define the first DZ.
Once the first DZ is established, R selects a face on this
DZ to support the formation of further DZs. Without loss of
generality, R first selects the face having the vertices 1, 2,
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Fig. 1. An example of forming detection zones.
3, and 4. This next DZ is also a cube sharing the selected
face with the first DZ. Therefore, the other four vertices of the
second DZ, is ( d
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). The centre
of the face formed by these four new vertices can be obtained
as (0, 0, d
2
√
3
+ d√
3
). We call the Euclidean distance between
R and this centre as the distance covered by the two DZs
(denoted as d′). If r≥d′, where r is the radius of Rs coverage,
R forms a further detection zone sharing the face defined by
the four vertices that are not on the first DZ.
R then starts forming a new DZ sharing the face defined
by the vertices 1, 2, 5, and 6 on the first DZ, by the similar
procedure as above. R continues forming further DZs until the
distance covered by all DZs formed in this second procedure
is ≥ r. Then, similarly, R starts forming a new DZ sharing
the face defined by the vertices 1, 4, 5, and 8 on the first DZ.
If the distance covered by the two DZs is < r, R continues
forming further DZs until the distance covered by all DZs in
this third procedure is ≥ r. Using the similar way above, R
forms more DZs by referring to other five faces on the first
DZ.
For all the space inside these established DZs, We call the
space inside established DZs as covered space. Once the DZs
along the eight faces of the first DZ have been formed, R
establishes other DZs in order to extend the covered space to
the whole coverage of R. Without loss of generality, R uses
the second DZ as the reference zone to continue establishing
further DZs along those faces on this reference zone that do
not have adjacent DZs. If all covered space by these DZs does
not fulfils R’s coverage, R uses the third established DZ as
the reference zone to form more DZs. The process continues
until the covered space of all DZs fills Rs coverage. Then, the
formation of detection zones completes.
B. Allocation and Ranking of Vehicles in Each Detection Zone
Once R has divided its coverage into a number of DZs, the
next step is to allocate vehicles on the road to a DZ based on
the vehicles location corrdinates. Like most vehicle networks,
in our system, vehicles periodically send Hello messages.
A Hello message generated by our vehicles contains three
fields: vehicle ID, the coordinates of vehicle’s current location,
and vehicle’s speed. A vehicle can may obtain its current
location coordinates by global positioning system (GPS) [20].
R extracts the vehicle’s current location coordinates from the
periodical Hello messages.
Suppose a vehicle’s current location is (x,y,z), R allocates
this vehicle to a specific DZ by comparing (x,y,z) with DZs’
coordinate boundaries. More specifically, for the ith DZ (i ∈
[0, n− 1), where n is the total number of DZs in R’s coverage,
we let xi,min, yi,min, and zi,min be the minimum values of
all points in this DZ on the x, y and z axes, respectively,
and xi,max, yi,max, and zi,max be the maximum values. R
compares x with xi,min and xi,max, y with yi,min and yi,max,
and z with zi,min and zi,max. The vehicle is allocated to the
ith DZ only when the vehicle’s coordinates meet xi,min ≤
x ≤ xi,max, yi,min ≤ y ≤ yi,max, and zi,min ≤ z ≤ zi,max.
The relationship between a vehicle and a DZ is dynamic as
the vehicle keeps moving. By the above way, based on the
latest Hello messages, R dynamically maps vehicles to DZs.
For vehicles allocated to the same DZ, R forms a rank-
ing list by sorting all vehicles in descending order of their
credibility. Many vehicle trust management schemes (e.g., [2],
[4]) have been designed to maintain vehicles’ credibility. In
[4],the blockchain is used to maintain the vehicles’ credibility
across RSUs. In [2], the cloud server is utilized to collect,
calculate, and store the trust values of all vehicles. Our scheme
can be easily integrated with these existing studies to enable
R to obtain vehicles’ credibility. As we will introduce in
the next subsection, this ranking list is referred to when
selecting vehicles to report events on the road. Our ranking
list dynamically changes with vehicles enters or leaves a DZ
as below.
1) When R receives a Hello message with a vehicle ID
which is not currently on the ranking list for the DZ,
R regards the vehicle as a new one entering into the
DZ. R achieves the credibility of this vehicle from
the blockchain or other vehicles (depending on the
employed vehicle trust management scheme). R then
places the ID of this vehicle on the ranking list so that
all vehicles in the DZ are ranked in the descending order
of their credibility.
2) When R has not received a Hello message, within a
time period (say 3 Hello periods), from a vehicle whose
ID is on the ranking list for the DZ, R regards that the
vehicle has left the DZ. The ID of the vehicle will hence
be removed from the ranking list.
Through the above steps, R complete the process of ranking
the vehicles in each DZ based on their credibility.
C. Selection of Reporting Vehicles
Once the n vehicles belonging to the same DZ are ranked,
R selects m (m < n) vehicles as event reporting vehicles
in this DZ. The first vehicle selected is the one on top of the
ranking list. To select the remaining (m−1) reporting vehicles,
R not only refers to vehicles’ credibility but also takes
into account whether vehicles interfere with those selected
reporting vehicles. In another words, R assigns each vehicle
that have not been selected as a report vehicle a weight. The
weight of the ith non-reporting vehicle is expressed by
ωi = α× Ci +
l−1∑
j=0
(βi,j × Ii,j),
where i ∈ [0, n− l − 1], l is the number of currently selected
reporting vehicles, Ci is the credibility of the ith non-reporting
vehicle, Ii,j indicates the interference relationship between the
ith non-reporting vehicle and the jth reporting vehicles, if the
ith non-reporting vehicle may interfere with the jth reporting
vehicles, li,j = 0; otherwise, Ii,j = 1. Besides, α and βi,j are
∈ (0, 1) with α+∑l−1j=0 βi,j = 1.
The weights of a non-overlapping vehicle may be changed
when a new reporting vehicle is selected, as the interference
relationship between this non-overlapping vehicle and the
new reporting vehicle needs to be included in the weight
expression. At each time when the weights of all non-reporting
vehicles are updated, R selects a non-reporting vehicle with
the largest weight as a new reporting vehicle until m reporting
vehicles are selected. Then, R selects m vehicles belonging to
another DZ as the reporting vehicle of this DZ, by the similar
way above. Once all DZs have m reporting vehicles selected,
R stops the current reporting vehicle selection procedure. R
selects m reporting vehicles for all DZs periodically because
vehicles change their DZs during the movement. When decid-
ing R’s period of updating the reporting vehicles in all DZs,
vehicles’ driving speeds, the size of DZs, and the period of
the Hello message should be referred to.
IV. SIMULATION EVALUATION
In this section, by using NS2.35, we apply our algorithm to
two trust management schemes recently proposed for vehicle
networks.
• The blockchain-based trust management (BCTM) [4]. It
allows all vehicles which detect the accident to broadcast
the incident report to the surrounding neighbours. Based
on the received reports, each receiver aggregates the
received reports and generate a trust rate for a specific
event.
• The neighborhood-based trust management (NBTM) [2].
It only allow the vehicles near a place where the accident
has just happened to report the incident. When the RSU
receives the reports, it requests the cloud server to verify
the credibility of the reporting vehicle, and return the
reporting vehicles credibility. The RSU will drop the re-
port from untrusted vehicles and send the correct incident
information to vehicles and RSUs around it.
More specifically, we simulate the two schemes with and
without our VTS algorithm. Namely, we evaluate BCTM-with-
VTS, BCTM-without-VTS, NBTM-with-VTS, and NBTM-
without-VTS along the following performance metrics.
• Average report delays (ARD). The report delay refers to
the period of time from a vehicle sending a report to
the RSU receiving this report. The average report delay
is calculated by
∑m−1
i=0 RDi
m , where m is the number of
reporting vehicles in a detection zone and RDi is the
report delay of the ith reporting vehicle.
• Report loss rate (RLR). When more than one vehicle
sends reports at the same time to the RSU, report loss
may occur. RLR is calculated by RLR = Rt−RrRt , where
Rt is the number of vehicles sending a report and Rr is
the number of reports received at the RSU.
The major parameters employed in our simulation is listed in
Table I.
TABLE I
NS2 SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameters Values
MAC standard 802 11
Antenna OmniAntenna
The number of vehicles 50 vehicles [4]
Hello packet and event report packet size 100 bytes [12], [21]
The interval of Hello messages 100 ms [21]
Wireless bandwidth 1 Mbps [22]
The transmission range of the RSU 1000 meters [23]
The transmission range of vehicles 250 meters [23]
The accurate detection range of vehicles 100 meters [24]
                                   Detection Zone 2                                   Detection Zone 1
RSU
Fig. 2. The topology diagram of the proposed scheme.
Fig.2 shows the topology diagram of this experiment. First,
based on the detection zone formation approach in Section III
A, we divided the RSU’s coverage into 103 detection zones.
For simplicity, we only show two detection zones in Fig.2.
Then put the vehicle into the corresponding detection zone
according to the current position of the vehicle. Suppose a car
accident (two black vehicles in Fig.2) is found in the detection
zone 2.
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Fig. 3. RLR vs the number of selected reporting vehicles in a detection zone
a) Report loss rate (RLR): To study the impact of the
number of reporting vehicles on RLR, for BCTM and NBTM,
we configure the reporting vehicles to broadcast the report to
all the surrounding vehicles and the RSU. While, for BCTM-
with-VTS and NBTM-with-VTS, we select certain vehicles to
unicast the report to the RSU. Fig.3 shows that as the number
of reporting vehicles in detection zone 2 increases, RLR also
increases if we use BCTM and NBTM. The reason is that
the increase in the number of reporting vehicles will increase
the number of interference domains, because vehicles are
randomly located in different interference domains, resulting
in the MAC layer collision occurs when broadcasting the
report simultaneously. To reduce the RLR to 0%, the RSU only
select the reporting vehicles that are outside of the interference
ranges of each other. Besides, not all vehicles in the detection
zone are allowed to send reports, VTS selects those vehicles
with high credibility, this design can reduce the occurrence
of MAC layer collision. As a result, we observe that RLR in
BCTM-with-VTS and NBTM-with-VTS remains 0%.
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Fig. 4. RLR vs the carrier sense range in the detection zone.
Fig.4 depicts how does the carrier sense range affect RLR,
we assume that the detection zone 2 has 23 vehicles in total;
the carrier sense range means that the nodes in the carrier
sensing range can sense the senders transmission [25]. Besides,
it is used for the collision detection, before transmitting, a
node first listens to the shared medium (such as listening for
wireless signals in a wireless network) to determine whether
another node is transmitting or not. If the carrier sensing range
is configured very short, the hidden node problem may occur,
a node may be transmitting where other nodes go undetected
at this stage; as a result, the report is dropped due to the MAC
layer collision. To check the impact of carrier sensing range
on transmission and RLR, we have modified carrier sensing
range in NS2 between 10 and 100 meters. The reason for
choosing 100 meters is because we do not want to affect the
transmission of other detection zones. Concerning the reality,
the position of the vehicles is randomly distributed. For all the
selected schemes, when carrier sense range is between 10 to 29
meters, the RSU cannot receive the report from the reporting
vehicles due to the RSU is outside the reporting vehicle’s
carrier sense range, for this reason, the RSU cannot sense
the senders transmission. After increasing the carrier sensing
range, the RSU starts to get the reports. However, we found
that because the reporting vehicles are randomly distributed,
the vehicles may be located in different carrier sense areas,
so the hidden terminal problem occurs. As a consequence,
We found that RLR will decrease as the range of the carrier
sense expands. For instance, the RLR in BCTM reduced from
90% to 60% and the RLR in NCTM dropped to 18%. Due to
VTS concerns the interference range between each reporting
vehicles, so VTS can mitigate the hidden terminal and reduce
RLR by selecting the reporting vehicles in the same sense area,
Fig.4 depicts that as the carrier sense range increases, RLR in
BCTM-with-VTS and NCTM-with-VTS remains at 0% after
30 meters.
b) Average report delay (ARD): We try to investigate
whether the number of vehicles in the detection zone 2 in-
creases will affect ARD. Fig 5 shows how ADR is affected by
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Fig. 5. ARD vs the number of selected reporting vehicles in a detection zone.
the number of reporting vehicles. For both BCTM and NBTM,
as the number of vehicles increase, ARD gradually increased
from 32ms to 112ms. The reason for this is that the reporting
vehicles in the same carrier sense need to check the channel
status if it senses the channel state is busy, then the reporting
vehicle will wait until the line is idle for transmission, which
will increase the transmission delay. Due to the content of
the report is consistent, VTS considers reducing the number
of reporting vehicles to accelerate the transmission speed.
Thereby, the reporting vehicles do not need to wait long to
obtain the channel resource. The simulation results show that
ARD in BCTM-with-VTS and NBTM-with-VTS remains at
33ms when the reporting vehicles continue to increase.
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Fig. 6. ARD vs the safety report size.
In previous experiments, the vehicles send the report with a
plain text. However, considering that security and privacy are
getting more and more attention, the communication between
RSUs and vehicles may adopt some security and privacy
protection mechanisms. Raya and Hubaux [26] concluded
that based on the signing algorithms, the report could have
a size between 200 and 800 bytes due to digital signatures
and certificates. Hence, in this test, we investigate how does
increasing the size of the report affect the ARD of the four
selected methods scheme. Fig.6 highlights that as a report
size increases, the delay also increase drastically. For BCTM
and NBTM schemes, due to many reporting vehicles send the
same report simultaneously, the receiver takes a long time to
aggregate all the reports together, such as, it takes 317ms to
completely receive all reports with a report size of 800 bytes.
Compared to the above two methods, considering that the
content of the report is consistent, so VTS does not select
all vehicles in the detection zone to send reports. Instead,
VTS selects certain vehicles around the vehicles with the
highest credibility in the detection zone. Although VTS still
generate delays, but it has greatly reduced ARD from 317ms
to 92ms when the report size is 800 bytes, this improvement
ensures that other vehicles get the car accident information
and respond to it immediately.
V. CONCLUSION
A trustworthiness assessment is a key mechanism that can
guarantee the security and reliability of information transmis-
sion in vehicle networks. Transmitting reports with minimum
latency and low report loss rate in vehicle networks is the
main issue that we undertake in this paper. We present a
vehicle transmission scheduling algorithm for the vehicle trust
management system. With the aid of this solution, the existing
trustworthiness solutions can achieve low latency and low
report loss rate when sending an incident report in the high-
density area. The experiment results show that our vehicle
transmission scheduling algorithm outperforms two selected
solutions in terms of different metrics such as the ARD and
RLR. As future work, we aim to study the optimal reporting
vehicles selection mechanism and consider more parameters
when selecting the reporting vehicle.
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